Thomas Hobbes Argued That Progress Continues in a Dialectical Process

Bijgewerkt op: 15 aug. 2019

An essential part of Kant's epistemological project such as reflected in his Critique of Pure Reason (Henceforth abbreviated CPR) is devoted to the limits and transgressions of the faculty of reason. Improperly deployed, Kant maintains, this faculty necessarily confronts itself with apparent contradictions—viz. reason's antinomy—and this is to be understood as mere dialectical illusion. As such, Kant's use of the term 'dialectic' seems to denote a negative interpretation, and a considerable section of his main critique is devoted to resolving the negative implications of reason's improper employment. Although Hegel acknowledges the truth of the recognized antinomy, his epistemological project does not reflect the negativity that Kant associated with it. Instead, Hegel positively adopted the dialectical employment of reason, and characterizes it as an essential feature of it. The aim of this paper will consist of an analysis of Kant's 'negative' philosophy pertaining to the dialectical employment such as reflected in the recognized antinomy, and an explication of Hegel's 'positive' philosophy, in which the dialectical employment is adopted and applied as an essential feature of 'Reason' proper.

Kant on dialectical illusion

Besides Kant's general aim to determine whether synthetic a priori propositions are possible, an important section—i.e., the Transcendental Dialectic—of the CPR is devoted to a critique of metaphysical approaches that were indicative of his time. Part of this critique involves a treatment of arguments characteristic of rationalist metaphysics pertaining to the nature and constitution of the world—i.e., rational cosmology. It is here where the antinomy makes its appearance, since the four recognized conflicts were considered necessary but illusionary implications of the faculty of reason. The remainder of this subsection will focus on one such conflict, and the dialectical illusion Kant identified with it. Kant dubs the conflicts of reason's antinomy cosmological 'because it always takes its object only from the sensible world and does not need any other world than that whose object is given to sense [...]'. The conflicts consist of four theses and corresponding anti-theses, and as such reflect four sets of dialectical assertions. The first two conflicts are designated as 'mathematical' because 'they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogeneous […]'. The implications that Kant drew from these conflicts can be understood as paramount for Kant's epistemological project, since he considered his epistemological dichotomy between phenomena and noumena as a necessary consequence.

The first mathematical conflict consists of the thesis that 'the world has, as to time and space, a beginning (limit), and its corresponding anti-thesis that 'the world is, as to time and space, infinite'.4 The world here is to be identified with the sum-total of phenomenal objects, including the laws governing them—viz. experience proper. Kant connects both assertions with the concept of magnitude, since an investigation in spatiotemporal (in)finity implies a magnitude pertaining to either spatial or temporal sequences. However, since both space and time function as pure forms of sensibility and as such are conceived as modes of experience, any investigation into the magnitude of either space or time necessarily fails, since experience properly defined does not contain space or time as sensible objects. Furthermore, the idea of the experience 'either of an infinite space or of an infinite time elapsed, or again, of the boundary of the world by an empty space or by an antecedent empty time, is impossible'. Both dialectical assertions, then, could only be determined when the world to which the concept of magnitude is applied is conceived as existing in itself, which is deemed impossible, since the world properly conceived is that of experience. Accordingly, both the thesis and anti-thesis that constitute the above-mentioned mathematical conflict must be false, and any attempt at determining a synthesis is necessarily 'ambiguous'.

The dialectical illusion that Kant here identifies consists of reason's unwarranted conflation of an object—e.g., the world—considered an sich instead of its properly designated phenomenological nature. Ipso facto, any metaphysical endeavor that ventures to solve this conflict on the basis of a transgression of reason's proper domain—viz., the application of concepts to an object considered in itself instead of its recognition as mere appearance—is destined to fail. Kant's introduction of the aforementioned dichotomy can be understood as a remedy to the dialectical illusion that is reflected by reason's antinomy, since it assigns to reason its proper boundaries. As such, his strategy is oftentimes conceived as a direct rebuttal of strategies that are articulated by transcendental realism, the latter which is characterized by its failure to draw a distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realm. However, an identification of the transcendental or dialectical illusion with transcendental realism may be premature, since the scope of the recognized illusion may reach further than the domain of transcendental realism alone.

The dialectical illusion that Kant here identifies consists of reason's unwarranted conflation of an object—e.g., the world—considered an sich instead of its properly designated phenomenological nature.

Hegel on dialectical progress

Contrary to Kant's negative association with the contradictions—i.e., antinomies—that are implicated by reason's dialectic, Hegel adopts the latter as an integral part of the understanding. Consequently, the dialectic here is identified with progress, and the appearance of contradiction ought not be avoided, but rather must be conceived as a positive and necessary component of 'Reason' proper. As such, it can be stated that Hegel was not entirely negative in regard to Kant's reflections on reason's antinomy, since both philosophers acknowledged the essential and necessary existence of contradiction in the determinations of the understanding. However, it seems fair to state that the comparison terminates here, since Kant's conclusions pertaining to the recognized antinomy receive a proper amount of criticism.

An example of the merits of dialectical progress such as envisaged by Hegel here seems in order. One essential determination of Reason that Hegel recognizes is that of the concept of 'being'. Considered in itself—viz., as immediate'—the term is meaningless: it is only by its antonymous concept of 'nothing' that it is properly understood. Hence, the concept 'being' necessarily gains its proper meaning only indirectly—viz., as 'mediate'—on the ground of its opposite concept. Since the meaning of each concept seems exclusively differentiated by the other, Hegel conceives of both concepts as appearing in a sense identical. As such, any initial attempt to determine an external criterion in order to determine their differentiation in meaning seems futile, but since the two concepts cannot be both contradictory and identical, a way out is required. It is here where the dialectical progress becomes apparent: the understanding—i.e., Reason—is in fact deemed able to subsume both apparently contradicting concepts under that of a 'richer' category, namely that of 'becoming'. Properly conceived, both the thesis and its opposite here give way to a synthesis, the latter which reflects a more complex concept or structure since it reconciles or sublates both 'moments' and as such 'determinatively negates' the apparent contradiction that initially existed. The dynamic character indicative of this progress is revealed by the fact that this latter concept is not considered as a terminus, but rather comes to the fore as yet another thesis of the dichotomy that the antinomy reflects. This demands the introduction of yet another complex concept so as to make sense of the newly formed contradiction. This dialectical progress, it is argued, will continue until Reason obtains its prober object, i.e., Absolute knowledge.

Contrary to Kant's negative association with the contradictions—i.e., antinomies—that are implicated by reason's dialectic, Hegel adopts the latter as an integral part of the understanding.

Conclusion

A considerable part of Kant's CPR is devoted to a critique of the dialectical employment of the faculty of reason. Employed as such, reason necessarily confronts itself with four recognized conflicts, each consisting of two sets of theses and corresponding anti-theses. One such conflict concerns the question whether the world is spatiotemporally limited or not. Kant asserts that both the thesis and its corresponding anti-thesis depend on the concept of magnitude. This conflict reflects a dialectical illusion because of several reasons. First, space and time are to be understood as pure forms of sensibility, and consequently do not exist as possible sensible objects within the world properly—i.e., phenomenally—conceived. As such, the idea of the experience of the world either as infinite or finite as to space or time constitutes a mere impossibility. Second, the conflict could only be resolved if the concept of magnitude were applied to the world considered in itself, which is deemed impossible. Hence, Kant considers both dialectical assertions to be false. The dialectical illusion here consists of reason's unwarranted transgression of its recognized boundaries, i.e., the conflation of an object of experience with an object in itself. Kant's dichotomy between a noumenal and a phenomenal realm is introduced as a necessary consequence, since it assigns to reason its proper boundaries. Contrary to Kant's negative analysis of the dialectical employment of the faculty of reason, Hegel positively integrates it within his epistemology and ascribes to it a necessary and fruitful existence. The existence of contradiction here is considered a necessary component of the determinations of the understanding, and it is here where the comparison between Kant and Hegel seems to end.

The progress that Hegel identifies with the dialectical employment of Reason can be explicated by his understanding of the concept of 'being'. Immediately conceived, the concept is meaningless: it is only by its antonymous concept 'nothing' that it properly obtains its meaning, and as such this meaning is mediated. Hence, Hegel conceives of both concepts as in a sense identical. This implies a contradiction, however, since both concepts cannot be contradictory and identical at the same time. However, Reason is in fact considered able to subsume both the concept of 'being' and its antonym 'nothing' under a more complex concept—viz., 'becoming'—that reconciles both concepts, now properly designated as 'moments'. This latter concept will eventually function as another thesis, together with a newly introduced antonym. This dialectical process will continue until Reason obtains Absolute knowledge as its proper object.

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Source: https://www.brandonpakker.com/post/dialectical-illusion-or-dialectical-progress-kant-and-hegel-on-dialectical-employment

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